T. Vukina and Danijel Nestic. Asymmetric Information in Health
Insurance: Some Preliminary Evidence from the Croatian State-Administered Supplemental Plan. Privredna Kretanja i Ekonomska Politika 115/2008.
X. Zheng, T. Vukina, and Changmock Shin. The Role of Farmers' Risk aversion for Contract Choice in the US Hog Industry.Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization. Vol. 6 (2008) Article 4.
T. Vukina, X. Zheng, Michele Marra and Armando Levy. Do Farmers Value the Environment? Evidence from a Conservation Reserve Program Aution.International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008, forthcoming
T. Vukina and X. Zheng. Structural Estimation of Rank-Order Tournament Games with Private Information. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.89 (August 2007): 651-664.
Zheng X. and T. Vukina. Efficiency Gains from Organizational Innovation: Comparing Ordinal and Cardinal Tournament Games in Broiler Contracts. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 25 (2007): 843-859.
Porametr Leegomonchai and T. Vukina. Political Economy of Regulation of Boiler Contracts. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 88(November 5, 2006):1258-1265.
Inoue, A. and T. Vukina. Testing for the Principal's Monopsony Power in Agency Contracts. Empirical Economics, Vol. 31 (2006): 717-734.
Vukina, T. and P. Leegomonchai. Oligopsony Power, Asset Specificity and Hold-Up: Evidence from the Broiler Industry. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88 (3), (August 2006): 589-605.
Leegomonchai, P. and T. Vukina. Dynamic Incentives and Agent Discrimination in Broiler Production Tournaments. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 14 (4), 2005: 849-877.
Pierre Dubois and T. Vukina. Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86(3) (August 2004): 835-841
Bontems, P., P. Dubois, and T. Vukina. Optimal Regulation of Private Production Contracts with Environmental Externalities. Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 26 (3), 2004: 287-301.
Levy, A. and T. Vukina. The League Composition Effect in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Players: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Contracts. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 22 (2), 2004: 353-377.
Vukina, T. The Relationship between Contracting and Livestock Waste Pollution. Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 25 (1), 2003: 66-88.
Levy, A. and T. Vukina. Optimal Linear Contracts with Heterogeneous Agents. European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 29 (2), 2002: 205-217.
Tsoulouhas, T. and T. Vukina. Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments versus Fixed Performance Standards. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83 (November), 2001: 1062-1073.
Vukina, T. C. E. Hilmer and D. Lueck. A Hotelling - Faustmann Explanation of the Structure of Christmas Tree Prices. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83 (August), 2001: 513-525.
Vukina, T. and A. Wossink. Environmental Policies and Agricultural Land Values: Evidence from the Dutch Nutrient Quota System. Land Economics, Vol. 76 (3), 2000: 413-429.
Tsoulouhas, T. and T. Vukina. Integrator Contracts with Many Agents and Bankruptcy. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81 (1), 1999: 61-74.
D.F. Li and T. Vukina. Effectiveness of Dual Hedging with Price and Yield Futures. The Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 18 (5), 1998: 541-561.
Palmquist, R. B., F. M. Roka, and T. Vukina. Hog Operations, Environmental Effects, and Residential Property Values. Land Economics, Vol. 73 (1), 1997: 114-124.
Vukina, T., D. F. Li, and D. Holthausen. Hedging with Crop Yield Futures: A Mean-Variance Analysis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78 (November), 1996: 1015-1025.
Vukina, T. and J. L. Anderson. A State-Space Forecasting Approach to Optimal Intertemporal Cross-Hedging. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 75 (May), 1993: 416-424.
Richard Vaccaro and T. Vukina. A Solution to the Positivity Problem in the State-Space Approach to Modeling Vector-Valued Time Series. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 17 (1993): 401-421.
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